Current discussion about how to reform European support schemes for renewable electricity neglects certain risks of market power in wholesale electricity markets. In a stylized Cournot model of interacting spot and forward electricity markets, I analyze how dierent support schemes aect producer strategies and, ultimately, competition in the wholesale market. I compare the strategic behavior of renewable and conventional producers in terms of electricity production and forward market sales in the presence of two different support schemes: feed-in taris and feed-in premiums. I show that the feed-in premium, which is the European Commission's current scheme of choice, may enhance market power and favor conventional over renewable production. It may also reduce the likelihood of achieving the political objective to increase production from renewable energy sources.
Introduction
European support schemes that promote the use of renewable sources of energy in electricity production are currently attracting erce criticism. They are blamed for distorting the internal European electricity market and for driving up consumer prices (European Commission, 2012a) . Support schemes for renewable electricity are in place because they help meet the wider policy objective of increasing the production of electricity from renewable sources of energy.
1 However, the European Commission has asked for existing support schemes to be reviewed, with the aim of bringing renewable electricity closer to the market to enhance competition and market eciency (European Commission, 2012a , 2014a .
Although competition and market eciency are eventually driven by producer behavior, current discussions about how to design ecient support schemes for renewable electricity are not informed by any rigorous microeconomic analysis of how dierent support schemes inuence producer behavior. It has been shown, that wholesale electricity markets are prone to market power and that market competition is inuenced by producer strategies (Wolfram, 1999; Wolak and Patrick, 2001; Borenstein et al., 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Mansur, 2007; Weigt and von Hirschhausen, 2008) . However, the microeconomic literature has invariably disregarded the strategic behavior of electricity producers − and their impact on wholesale market competition − in the presence of dierent support schemes for renewable electricity.
Whereas there is a debate about possible impacts of support schemes on incentives for investment in generation capacity, this debate does not look at how support schemes aect producer strategies in wholesale electricity markets conditional on capacity investment being installed. Answering this question is important: Support schemes do not only come as a reward for renewable investment, some of them transform electricity producers into strategic participants in wholesale markets, with implications for market power and competition. This paper takes a game-theoretic approach and analyzes the impact of support schemes for renewable electricity on the strategic behavior of conventional and renewable electricity producers and, ultimately, on wholesale market competition. It does not study the eect of support schemes on consumer prices or capacity investment.
Because electricity wholesale markets take place at dierent moments in time, the paper aims at understanding the production and the forward trading behavior of electricity producers, building on work of Allaz and Vila (1993) . In a symmetric Cournot duopoly that sells a homogeneous commodity, Allaz and Vila demonstrate the emergence of a forward market even if participants are risk neutral and there is, therefore, no risk-hedging motive. They nd that forward trading strengthens competition and eciency in the market: Both producers have a unilateral incentive to use the forward market as a commitment device for higher production.
2 However, when both sell on the forward market they are worse o, because aggregate production increases, pushing equilibrium prices down.
I apply the Allaz and Vila (1993) framework to the electricity market and extend the model by introducing an asymmetric renewable producer and by analyzing the production and forward trading behavior of conventional and renewable producers under dierent support schemes for renewable electricity. Renewable production diers from conventional one in marginal cost and the available capacity. I consider two support schemes for renewable electricity: feed-in taris and feed-in premiums.
In a feed-in tari system, during a guaranteed amount of time, the renewable energy producer receives a statutory xed amount per kWh of electricity produced. As a result, the producer is not exposed to market signals and does not actively participate in the market. Feed-in taris are used in most of the European member states and are heavily criticized for the excessive cost burden they generate for consumers and potential ineciencies due to dispatch and maintenance decisions. Therefore, the European Commission decided to phase out feed-in taris as of January 2016 (European Commission, 2014b) .
Under a premium scheme, renewable energy producers sell their electricity actively in the market and are granted a premium on top of the market price. This type of scheme is currently advocated by the European Commission (European Commission, 2014b) . Because it partially exposes renewable energy producers to market price risks, it is said to help integrate renewable electricity into the market and to decrease market distortions (European Commission, 2012b) . At least two types of premium schemes are discussed: a oating premium, under which a variable subsidy complements the market price to guarantee a xed remuneration, 4 and a xed premium, under which a xed subsidy is paid at any market price.
Each scheme will aect the strategic behavior of producers in wholesale electricity markets quite dierently. Understanding the ultimate impact on competition (measured in wholesale prices) is not straightforward. Two main competitive eects have been underlined in previous studies:
First, the economic literature regularly uses the seminal paper of Allaz and Vila (1993) to study electricity markets (e.g. Powell, 1993; Kamat and Oren, 2004; Willems, 2005; Bushnell, 2007) and widely acknowledges that forward markets have benecial eects on competition. 5 The pro-competitive impact of forward electricity markets was conrmed experimentally by Le Coq and Orzen (2006) , Brandts et al. (2008) and van Koten and Ortmann (2013) . Further evidence has been provided by the empirical literature (e.g. Wolak, 2000; Fabra and Toro, 2005; Bushnell et al., 2008) . Only a few studies model renewable electricity in a set-up with forward markets (e.g. Twomey and Neuho, 2010; Liski and Montero, 2014 ), but do not analyze how dierent support schemes perform in such a framework. My paper contributes towards explaining this issue.
A second aspect of competition is important for my analysis: Due to its zero marginal cost, renewable electricity will be at the bottom of the merit order curve on the electricity exchange, 6 which pushes wholesale electricity prices down. This phenomenon is known as the merit order eect (e.g. Sensfuÿ et al., 2008; Sáenz de Miera et al., 2008) . Models that study this short-term competitive eect of renewable electricity generally disregard the strategic behavior in renewable and conventional electricity production or model strategies of the conventional producer in isolation. However, it is not clear how interacting producer strategies materialize and in what way they dier under dierent support schemes. To the best of my knowledge, no analytical microeconomic research has tried to answer this question. My model will be critical in this respect.
I nd that replacing a feed-in tari by a feed-in premium has an ambiguous eect on competition. Therefore, it is not obvious whether the premium enhances market eciency relative to the feed-in tari, as it was put forward by the Euro-4 Broadly speaking, the oating premium will equal the feed-in tari minus the market price. Contracts for dierences work in a similar way when a variable payment is made to cover the dierence between the strike price (guaranteed remuneration) and the reference price.
5 It has been shown that the pro-competitive eect of forward markets is reduced or reversed if main assumptions of the model are changed, e.g. if forward positions are not observable (Bagwell, 1995; Hughes and Kao, 1997) , if producers compete à la Bertrand (Mahenc and Salanié, 2004) or if a dynamic framework is chosen (Ferreira, 2003; Liski and Montero, 2006) . 6 The merit order curve represents the supply curve at the electricity exchange and ranks the available generating technologies according to their short-run marginal costs. 4 pean Commission. The answer to that question depends both on the design of the premium and on the level of renewable energy that is available for production:
First, replacing the feed-in tari by a oating premium has no eect in terms of producer strategies or competition. Under both schemes, renewable producers receive a xed and positive remuneration. Therefore, all renewable electricity will literally be dumped on the market whenever it is available in real time. Equilibrium prices adapt accordingly and are the same under both schemes.
Second, using a xed premium instead of the feed-in tari transforms renewable electricity producers into strategic market participants. The relative competitive impact of the xed premium derives from two counteracting eects on equilibrium prices. On the one hand, electricity producers as a whole will use their oligopoly power to set prices at a relatively high level (anti-competitive eect). On the other hand, they have an incentive to use the forward market, which has a procompetitive eect. The net eect on wholesale market competition − that is which of the two eects dominates − depends on the amount of renewable energy that is available and the level of the premium. Market power is most likely to prevail when a lot of renewable electricity is produced and when the premium is low. In such situations, conventional electricity production gains relative to a feed-in tari world, whereas renewable production is worse o and reduced.
Because of the current political will to increase production from renewable energy at lowest costs, the implementation of a xed premium may put at risk market competition and compliance with the political target. Note that the strategic effects disappear when the level of the premium is very generous. With the high remuneration, all available renewable electricity will again be dumped on the market and the price eect under both support schemes is the same.
These ndings support the main message of the paper: Although the change in support schemes towards a premium was motivated by market integration and eciency, it may actually increase market power. Because the relative competitive impact of the premium scheme is ambiguous, a policy decision to push for a wider use of this support scheme should be backed by more detailed analysis as to when the premium outperforms the feed-in tari in terms of market eciency.
Finally, my analysis underlines another dimension of the theoretical model. Asymmetric production constraints act as a commitment device for electricity producers to withhold production and reduce the competitive pressure from the forward market. The intuition is the following: Because the production of renewable electricity can be constrained, there exists an equilibrium in which the pro-competitive forward market is not used and aggregate electricity production is reduced. Both types of electricity producers can manipulate the renewable production constraint to increase the possibility of deviation from the equilibrium that uses the forward market and where competition is relatively higher.
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The next section outlines my basic theoretical model. In section 3 and 4, I analyze producer strategies and wholesale prices under a feed-in tari and feed-in premium respectively. Section 5 uses comparative statics to study in more detail the strategic eect that is introduced with the feed-in premium, and section 6 closes with some nal remarks and policy recommendations.
2 The Model: Set-up and Notation My paper extends the Allaz and Vila (1993) Cournot set-up by integrating a renewable electricity producer that is promoted by either a feed-in tari or a premium scheme. Following the reasoning of Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) , I use a Cournot and not a Bertrand model of oligopolistic competition, because I assume that market power in the electricity wholesale market takes the form of producers declaring short term capacity constraints in generation. 7 Furthermore, in my model renewable production faces a constraint which violates the Bertrand paradigm.
8 Finally, using a static Cournot instead of a supply function equilibrium model has the advantage of providing unique solutions. 9 The Cournot case can be seen as a static worst case scenario of supply function equilibria. As a consequence, my results will be only part of the truth but will point out exactly those areas in which policy makers need to be particularly careful.
In my set-up there is one conventional (c) and one renewable electricity producer (r). The latter generates electricity from a renewable source of energy (e.g. wind or sun). He diers from the conventional producer in two respects: (1) his marginal cost is zero (i.e. wind blows / the sun shines without costs) and (2) his production is variable and depends on the availability of the energy source (i.e. the amount of wind / sun). Both producers are risk neutral.
Contrary to other papers, I do not model the renewable electricity producer as a competitive fringe but as a full market participant, because renewable electricity covers large parts of the market already today and will further increase its share in the future.
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Note that this paper describes electricity production in a deterministic frame-7 E.g. Wolak and Patrick (2001) have shown that producers in England and Wales obtained higher prices than the competitive one by withholding capacities. 8 The Bertrand mechanism only works properly when rms are able to price below their competitors and to expand output so as to capture the whole market. 9 The supply function equilibrium concept of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) has also been applied to understand electricity market competition in the presence of forward contracts (e.g. Newbery, 1998; Green, 1999) . 10 In 2012, the annual share of wind and solar energy in nal electricity consumption amounts to 33% in Denmark, 24% in Spain and 23% in Portugal (raw data from Eurostat). Due to current political objectives, this share is expected to grow. 6 work, because it focuses on understanding the strategic behavior of electricity producers and wants to abstract from their attitude towards risk. However, to account for the variability of the renewable energy source, I analyze the model for dierent realizations of this energy source by introducing a constraint on renewable production that may take dierent levels. In that sense, variability can be dened in terms of diurnal cycles of solar radiation that are generally predictable at a day-ahead level. It can also be interpreted as a technical capacity constraint that diers across European member states. Broadly speaking, it comes down to assuming that renewable production is known by the time the day-ahead market opens.
Production: q c and q r represent the electricity production of producer c and r respectively. Renewable production is constrained to k > 0. k represents the availability of the renewable energy source and may take any level. Conventional production is always unconstrained.
Costs: Because this model does not focus on investment incentives, neither producer faces xed costs. The conventional producer has linear production costs with marginal cost c > 0. The renewable producer's marginal cost is zero if energy is available for production and innity otherwise.
Demand: Market demand is represented by the inverse demand function p = a−Q, where a represents the maximum willingness to pay and where Q = q c + q r . It is assumed that a − k > c to exclude trivial results, that is to ensure that every player has an interest to produce.
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Timing: There are two sequential markets for electricity: a forward market (e.g. the day-ahead electricity market 12 ) and a spot market (e.g. the intraday or balancing electricity market). Electricity trading takes place in two stages:
The producers have the possibility of signing binding and observable forward contracts (f c and f r ) that need to be delivered in t=2. Competitive speculators represent the demand for forward positions.
• t=2 − Production and spot market:
The producers generate electricity (q c and q r ) and compete in the spot market taking into consideration the forward positions contracted in t=1.
11 When a − k > c, minimum residual demand for conventional electricity (market demand net of maximum available renewable electricity) exceeds the marginal cost of the conventional producer. He will always nd it protable to enter the market.
12 Technically speaking, electricity that has been sold on the day-ahead market is not delivered before the day after. This characterizes the day-ahead market as a forward market. A similar denition has been adopted in Borenstein et al. (2008) and Holmberg (2011). Prices: The spot market price clears the spot market. Whatever forward sales, spot market inverse demand is given by p 2 = a − q c − q r . 13 There are no arbitrage opportunities between the spot and the forward market: The forward market price is equal to the spot market price, p 1 = p 2 . 14 Support Schemes: The feed-in tari and the oating premium ensure that a xed remuneration, x ≥ 0, is paid to the renewable producer at any price, whereas a xed premium adds a xed amount, τ ≥ 0, on top of the market price.
Payos: The electricity producer's overall payo is given by:
Payos consist of forward market revenues (rst summand), spot market revenues (second summand) and production costs (third summand if existent). The renewable producer's payo depends on the support scheme in place.
Because there are no arbitrage opportunities between the spot and the forward market (i.e. p 1 = p 2 = a − q c − q r ), overall payos can be written as:
For ease of representation, in the remainder I will call spot market payos the additional payos once forward quantities are locked in:
Spot market payos depend on spot market revenues (rst summand) 15 and production costs (second summand if existent).
Competition: Equilibrium prices are used as a proxy to measure competition in the market.
14 If prices in the two markets were dierent, competitive speculators would buy (sell) forward positions in the rst stage and sell (buy) them in the second stage at a higher (lower) price. This would happen up to the point where the two prices equalize.
15 If q c < f c or q r < f r , the producer is selling more on the forward market than he actually produces and needs to buy the shortfall on the spot. I am considering subgame perfect equilibria in the spirit of Selten (1975) and solve the game by backward induction. I will rst derive the potential equilibria in the spot market game (second stage), which will be a function of the number of contracts that have been sold on the forward market (rst stage). Afterwards, I will solve for subgame perfect equilibria in the forward market, by incorporating the second stage equilibrium quantities into the overall prot functions (i.e. assuming that players anticipate to play equilibrium in the spot market).
3 Feed-in Tari and Floating Premium I will rst study competition under a feed-in tari, where the renewable producer is granted a xed amount, x ≥ 0, for any unit of electricity available. Because a oating premium aims at complementing the market price by a variable subsidy that guarantees a xed remuneration as well, its eect on producer strategies in the wholesale market will be the same as long as the remuneration is non-negative. The analysis of the two support schemes is therefore carried out jointly.
Production stage (t=2)
In stage 2, forward positions, f c and f r , are observed. The conventional producer chooses production quantities so as to maximize his spot market payo given the spot market price he faces.
The best response of the conventional producer in stage 2 solves the maximization problem in (1) and is described in the following lemma. Lemma 1. Under a feed-in tari/oating premium, the best response of the conventional producer in stage 2 is given by:
The conventional producer's best response in stage 2 is increasing in the maximum willingness to pay, a, and decreasing in own marginal production costs, c, and in renewable production, which are features of the general Cournot best response function. Additionally, it is also increasing in own forward position. As argued rst by Allaz and Vila (1993) , this reects the conventional producer's strategic advantage of using the forward market: Having a short position on the forward market (f c > 0) represents a commitment for higher production, which decreases equilibrium prices and reduces the marginal protability of spot market sales. At the same time, the forward position makes the conventional producer less price sensitive in the spot market, because inframarginal units are reduced. More precisely, the conventional producer's marginal revenue in the spot market is relatively higher when he sells on the forward market:
q c + p, where ∂p ∂qc < 0 and f c > 0. Finally, by selling forward, the conventional producer can increase overall production without suering from the resulting lower price on his forward position.
The renewable electricity producer maximizes his spot market payo given the remuneration he faces. Because his production depends on the amount of renewable energy that is available, he is subject to a constraint.
The following lemma describes the best response of the renewable electricity producer in stage 2 that solves the maximization problem in (2).
Lemma 2. Under a feed-in tari/oating premium, the best response of the renewable producer in stage 2 is given by:
Renewable equilibrium production is at and aected neither by the forward market nor by conventional production. Because the renewable producer receives a positive xed remuneration and his marginal cost is zero, he always produces as much as he can.
Optimal strategies in stage 2 are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Under a feed-in tari/oating premium, optimal strategies in stage 2 are given by:
The two potential equilibria in the spot market depend only on the forward position of the conventional producer. For a high enough conventional forward position, that is if f c ≥ −(a − k − c), there is an interior equilibrium, in which both rms produce. Otherwise, there is a renewable monopoly.
Forward market (t=1)
Following the structure of Allaz and Vila (1993) , I am now calculating the equilibrium in the forward market, if it exists, by incorporating the optimal strategies of stage 2 into the overall maximization problem.
The conventional electricity producer chooses his forward position so as to maximize his overall payo.
The renewable electricity producer is indierent to the use of the forward market. As stated in Lemma 2, optimal renewable production does not depend on forward positions.
The following theorem characterizes the subgame perfect equilibria under a feed-in tari and a oating premium. Theorem 1. Equilibrium (Feed-in Tari/Floating Premium):
In any subgame perfect equilibrium of the feed-in tari/oating premium model, the conventional producer does not use the forward market, f * F IT c = 0, and the renewable producer is indierent of using it, f * F IT r = any. Spot market equilibrium strategies are given by q * F IT c
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium price is
Proof.
Given Lemma 3, spot market equilibria only depend on f c . Therefore,
Theorem 1 adds to the general result of Allaz and Vila (1993) . The renewable producer, receiving a xed and positive remuneration, always produces at the maximum. He is indierent about using the forward market as a commitment device for production. As a consequence, the conventional producer cannot aect renewable production choices. Because he is not able to increase his own production at the expense of his competitor and because he anticipates the pro-competitive potential of forward trades, he has no incentive to use the forward market at all.
As the main objective of the paper is to analyze competition, the unique equilibrium price, (a + c). As gure 1 shows, under a feed-in tari or a oating premium scheme, equilibrium prices decrease proportionally to the amount of available renewable electricity, k. The reason is that the maximum amount of renewable electricity is always produced. Residual demand for conventional electricity decreases proportional to k.
16 In a conventional monopoly, prices are not aected by renewable electricity production.
Fixed premium
Let me now turn to studying competition under a xed premium, where the renewable electricity producer receives a xed amount, τ ≥ 0, on top of the wholesale market price.
Production stage (t=2)
The maximization problem of the conventional electricity producer in stage 2 is the same as under the feed-in tari and given by (1). What changes under the xed premium scheme is the prot of the renewable electricity producer, whose maximization problem in stage 2 is given by
The electricity producers' best responses in stage 2 solve (1) and (4) respectively and are described in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Under a xed premium, the best responses in stage 2 are given by:
The best response of each producer is increasing in the producer's own forward position, f c and f r respectively, which reects the strategic advantage of using a forward market and holds for the conventional and for the renewable electricity producer, when the latter does not hit his constraint. The best response is also increasing in the maximum willingness to pay, a, and decreasing in the producer's own marginal cost, c and −τ respectively, where the premium can be seen as a negative marginal cost to the renewable producer. For a certain amount of the renewable energy source, k ≤ 1 2 (a + τ − q c + f r ), the renewable producer is constrained. Below this threshold, he cannot play his unconstrained Cournot output but produces at capacity. The best responses can cross in six ways. The resulting six potential stage 2 equilibria are described in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Under a xed premium, there are six potential equilibria in stage 2 depending on stage 1 action (f c , f r ). In the 13
• unconstrained interior equilibrium (UCI), both rms produce and the renewable producer is not constrained;
• constrained interior equilibrium (CI), both rms produce and the renewable producer is constrained;
• unconstrained renewable monopoly (UCRM), the conventional producer does not produce and the renewable producer is not constrained;
• constrained renewable monopoly (CRM), the conventional producer does not produce and the renewable producer is constrained;
• conventional monopoly (CM), only the conventional producer produces;
• last equilibrium (NO), no one produces.
The full characterization of all six potential equilibria is given in appendix A. In the remainder, I focus only on those equilibria that will be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium: the unconstrained (UCI) and the constrained (CI) interior equilibrium. Here is their characterization:
Lemma 6. Under a xed premium, there is
The corresponding equilibrium strategies of stage 2 are
• a constrained interior equilibrium, if k ≤ 1 3
(a + 2τ + c − f c + 2f r ) and if f c ≥ −(a − k − c). The corresponding equilibrium strategies of stage 2 are
As in Allaz and Vila (1993) , second stage equilibrium strategies in the unconstrained equilibrium are increasing in own forward position and decreasing in the forward position of the competitor. This describes the strategic use of the forward market as a commitment for higher production at the expense of the competitor. Dierent from Allaz and Vila (1993) , renewable production may be constrained. Second stage equilibrium strategies in the constrained equilibrium are the same as in the feed-in tari case.
The unconstrained equilibrium arises, when the renewable producer has enough energy available to produce his optimal interior quantity, k > q * U CI r (f c , f r ). There is a constrained equilibrium, when available renewable energy is not high enough to reach optimal interior production, k ≤ q * U CI r (f c , f r ). Note that the renewable production constraint, k = 1 3 (a+2τ +c−f c +2f r ), which equals optimal renewable production in the unrestricted equilibrium, q * U CI r (f c , f r ), leads to a second strategic eect. It decreases with the forward position of the conventional producer and increases with that of the renewable one. The two electricity producers, by choosing an appropriate forward position, can manipulate the constraint. In the next subsection, I will show that they have a strategic interest to keep renewable production constrained under certain conditions.
Forward market (t=1)
In stage 1, assuming no arbitrage opportunities and given the equilibrium strategies played in stage 2, the two electricity producers choose their forward position so as to maximize their overall payos (5) and (6).
Note that for some parameter values, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; for others, the subgame perfect equilibria are multiple in the forward market. Two types of equilibria exist: an unconstrained (UCI) and a constrained (CI) interior equilibrium, which depend on whether or not the renewable production constraint is binding. Before giving the formal statement of the equilibria, I will explain their intuition. The mathematical proof is in Appendix B.
To visualize the results, gure 3 represents the two equilibria for dierent realizations of the renewable energy source. For relatively high levels of the renewable energy source, the renewable production constraint does not bind. There is an unconstrained equilibrium, in which the forward market is used strategically (Allaz and Vila eect): Each producer has a unilateral incentive to take a short position on the forward market to lock in production ex-ante and increase prots at the expense of the competitor. Equilibrium strategies in the forward market are f * U CI c (a + 3τ + 2c). For relatively low levels of the renewable energy source, the renewable production constraint binds. There is a constrained equilibrium, in which renewable production is at capacity and the forward market is not used strategically. As in section 3, the conventional producer cannot aect his competitor's production choice to his advantage, and has no incentive to use the forward market, f * CI c = 0. The renewable producer is again indierent to the use of the forward market. However, he needs to ensure that the conventional producer has no incentive to deviate to the unconstrained equilibrium. Therefore, his optimal forward position is f r ≥f r . Equilibrium outcomes are q * CI c = 1 2 (a − k − c) and q * CI r = k.
Denition 1. The forward position threshold isf
Any renewable forward position equal or above the forward position threshold, f r , reduces the protability of the spot market in the unconstrained equilibrium to a level that disincentivizes the conventional producer to deviate there. The conventional producer could do so by taking a short position on the forward market,
(a − 2τ − 3c), instead of not using it, f * CI c = 0. However, for f r ≥f r , any positive conventional forward position would depress the spot market price event further so that a deviation to the unconstrained equilibrium is not protable for the conventional producer. 18 Because f r ≥f r implies f r ≥ f * U CI r ∀ k ≥ k 1 , the renewable producer makes sure that the Having explained the two types of equilibria and the associated optimal forward market strategies, I will now explain the conditions for those equilibria.
The unconstrained equilibrium is valid if τ <τ and k ≥ k 1 .
Denition 2. The prohibitive premium isτ = 1 2 (a − 3c).
The rst condition for the unconstrained equilibrium is τ <τ . As soon as τ ≥τ , the renewable producer's remuneration is so generous that production would always be at maximum capacity, k. An unconstrained equilibrium could never happen. (a−2τ −3c).
k ≥ k 1 is the second condition for the unconstrained equilibrium. It ensures that the conventional producer has no incentive to deviate to the constrained equilibrium, in which his payo would be smaller. 20 Now, if the conventional producer forwards according to his unconstrained equilibrium strategy and because there is enough renewable energy available, the renewable producer's best response in the forward market is to play the unconstrained equilibrium as well.
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The constrained equilibrium is valid if τ <τ and k < k 2 or if τ ≥τ .
Denition 4. The renewable restriction threshold is k 2 = 1 2 (a + 2τ + c). It equals optimal renewable production when the conventional producer plays his constrained equilibrium strategy in stage 1.
First, if τ <τ , the constrained equilibrium arises if and only if k < k 2 . As soon as k ≥ k 2 , the renewable production constraint would never bind because optimal renewable production could be reached for any equilibrium forward position of the conventional producer. 22 unconstrained equilibrium cannot be an equilibrium in stage 1. For k < k 1 , the conventional producer has no incentive to play his unconstrained equilibrium strategies anyhow: π * U CI c < π * CI c i k < k 1 . 19 If τ ≥τ optimal renewable production in the unconstrained equilibrium increases up to a level that lies outside the possible range of k: τ ≥τ implies q * U CI r ≥ a − c.
20 For this parameter range, the conventional producer's payo in the unconstrained equilibrium always exceeds that in the constrained one:
If τ <τ and k ≥ k 1 , there is enough renewable energy available to reach the unconstrained equilibrium outcome: k 1 > q * U CI r i τ <τ . 22 If τ <τ , optimal renewable production given the optimal conventional forward position in the constrained equilibrium exceeds optimal renewable production given the optimal conventional forward position in the unconstrained equilibrium: k 2 > q * U CI r . Therefore, if k ≥ k 2 , renewable equilibrium production would not be constrained for any forward market strategy of the conventional producer.
Second, as explained above, τ ≥τ is a sucient condition for the constrained equilibrium. In this case, the premium is so generous that renewable production is always at capacity.
Finally, note that if k ∈ [k 1 ; k 2 ] and if τ <τ , the two equilibria coexist and none of them Pareto dominates the other. The conventional producer prefers the unconstrained equilibrium and the renewable producer the constrained one. There is a third equilibrium in which producers mix in the forward market. Each forward market equilibrium leads to a unique equilibrium in the spot market.
The following theorem gives the formal statement of the subgame perfect equilibria under a xed premium.
Theorem 2. Equilibrium (Fixed Premium):
In the xed premium model (a + 3τ + 2c).
Stage 2 equilibrium strategies are q * U CI c
The subgame perfect equilibrium price is:
(a − 2τ + 2c).
• if τ ≥τ or if τ <τ and k < k 1 , there is a constrained subgame perfect equilibrium with stage 1 equilibrium strategies f * CI c = 0 and f * CI r ≥f r . Stage 2 equilibrium strategies are q * CI c
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium price is: p * CI = 1 5
• otherwise, there are three equilibria, the two already mentioned and a third equilibrium in which the producers mix in the rst stage.
Proof. See Appendix B
Note that the conventional restriction threshold,
(a − 2τ − 3c), increases with the willingness to pay, a, the marginal cost of the conventional producer, c, and the premium, τ . An increase in any of the parameters reduces the conventional producer's relative preference for the unconstrained equilibrium, when both equilibria are possible. 23 Thus, deviations to the constrained equilibrium become protable at a higher level of k. This result is driven by the fact that 23 At k ∈ [q * U CI r ; k 2 ], an increase in any of the parameters would increase (decrease) the conventional producer's prot more (less) in the constrained equilibrium than in the unconstrained one: rst, , third,
there cannot be an unconstrained (constrained) equilibrium anyhow.
renewable production in the constrained equilibrium is at, which makes the conventional producer gain (lose) relatively more (less) in the constrained equilibrium when a (c and τ ) increases.
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The forward position threshold,f r = a − τ − 2c − √ 2(a − c − k), is increasing in available renewable electricity, k. The intuition is that the conventional producer's prot in the constrained equilibrium decreases proportional to the level of k. On the contrary, his prot in the unconstrained equilibrium is not aected by changes in k. Therefore, more available renewable electricity makes the constrained equilibrium relatively less protable to the conventional producer. The renewable producer needs more eort (that is a bigger forward position) to prevent deviations.
The threshold,f r , is decreasing in the maximum willingness to pay, a, the marginal cost of the conventional producer, c, and the premium, τ . Similar to above, with a unit increase in these parameters the conventional producer's relative preference for the constrained equilibrium increases. The renewable producer needs a smaller forward position to prevent him from deviating to the unconstrained equilibrium. Figure 4 graphically represents equilibrium prices under the xed premium and the feed-in tari. Again, equilibrium prices are represented on the y−axis and available renewable electricity on the x−axis. For ease of representation, I assume that the unconstrained equilibrium prevails in the range where multiple equilibria exist, because this is the only situation in which prices under the xed premium dier from those under the feed-in tari. Adding the multiplicity of equilibria would not add insight in terms of instrument comparison. For the same reason, it is assumed that τ <τ .
In the unconstrained equilibrium (right hand side of gure 4, at k ≥ k 1 ), where the renewable producer chooses his optimal quantity and where both producers use the forward market for strategic reason, equilibrium prices under the xed premium dier from those under the feed-in tari. This eect, as well as the role of the premium, is further analyzed in section 5. 24 For instance, with regard to the premium, τ , the intuition is that an increase of the premium only aects electricity production in the unconstrained equilibrium. A higher premium increases production of the renewable producer, q * U CI r = 2 5 (a + 3τ + 2c), and decreases that of the conventional one, q * U CI c = 2 5 (a−2τ −3c). Because renewable production is relatively cheaper, its increase exceeds the decrease in conventional production in absolute terms,
∂τ . More electricity is produced in the aggregate, which reduces equilibrium prices, p * U CI = 1 5 (a − 2τ + 2c). In the constrained equilibrium, quantities and prices are not aected by the premium,
As a consequence, with an increase in the premium, the conventional producer loses relatively less in the constrained equilibrium; the opportunity cost of market power in the unconstrained equilibrium is higher. (The intuition is similar for an increase in c and a decrease in a.) In the constrained equilibrium (left hand side of gure 4, at k < k 1 ), where the renewable producer does not choose his optimal quantity and where the forward market is not used strategically, the equilibrium price under the xed premium equals that under the feed-in tari. It decreases proportionally to the available amount of renewable electricity, k.
Finally, recall that q * U CI r represents the equilibrium outcome of the renewable producer in the unconstrained equilibrium. For k ∈ [q * U CI r ; k 1 ], the constrained equilibrium arises, although the unconstrained equilibrium is technically feasible (i.e. k > q * U CI r ). By choosing an appropriate forward market strategy, the electricity producers manipulate the renewable production constraint and extend the occurrence of the constrained equilibrium, in which equilibrium prices are relatively higher. The renewable production constraint acts as a commitment device to withhold capacity.
Generally speaking, in the presence of asymmetric production constraints, the competitive pressure from the forward market, which was predicted by Allaz and Vila (1993) , is reduced. This result relates to work of Grimm and Zoettl (2006), 25 de Frutos and Fabra (2012) , 26 and Liski and Montero (2014) .
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25 Grimm and Zoettl (2006) extend the original Allaz and Vila (1993) framework to analyze incentives of electricity producers to invest in capacity, prior to a continuum of forward and spot markets. Their analysis diers from mine, because, in their model, producers have a symmetric cost structure and may face endogenous capacity constraints. Furthermore, they assume demand to be varying. 26 de Frutos and Fabra (2012) analyze the impact of forward contract commitments on competition and nd that those commitments can harm competition if rms are asymmetric in size. Dierent from my approach, they study a model with supply function equilibria, increasing marginal cost and exogenous forward contracts.
27 Liski and Montero (2014) apply the Allaz and Vila (1993) model to a framework with exhaustible resources. In the case, where rms dier in their initial resource stock, they nd that the competitive pressure of the forward market is reduced. This case is the closest to my framework, if we interpret their exogenous resource stock as a production constraint. It however diers 20 5 The Strategic Eect of the Feed-in Premium Figure 4 above shows the nal impact on competition of both the feed-in tari and the xed premium scheme. This section studies in more detail the strategic eect that is introduced by the xed premium in the unconstrained equilibrium (right hand side of the gure). Because the oating premium scheme does not alter equilibrium strategies and prices compared to the feed-in tari, its eects are not discussed here. In the remainder, I assume that the unconstrained equilibrium prevails where multiple equilibria exist and that τ <τ .
Basic eects: Market Power vs. Competition
In the unconstrained equilibrium of the xed premium model, the strategic behavior of the electricity producers diers in two dimensions from that in the feed-in tari model. First, the strategic timing of electricity sales varies: Under the feed-in tari, the forward market is not used strategically. Under the xed premium, both producers use the spot and the forward market to sell electricity. Second, there is also a dierence in the degree of strategic behavior involved in the renewable production decision: Under the feed-in tari, all available renewable electricity is dumped on the market, whereas, under the xed premium, renewable production involves an optimization and is below maximum capacity.
Any rigorous comparison of support schemes needs to disentangle the role of the two dimensions. To do so, I use a counterfactual model which diers in only one dimension from each of the two existing schemes: No producer sells electricity on the forward market (close to feed-in tari) and the renewable producer freely chooses how much electricity to produce (close to xed premium scheme). The counterfactual model is equivalent to using the xed premium model of section 4, but forcing f c = f r = 0. This results in two Nash equilibria that are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Equilibrium (Counterfactual):
There are two Nash equilibria in the counterfactual model.
(a+2τ +c) and τ < a−2c, there is a unique unconstrained equilibrium with optimal strategies q * U E c
The Nash equilibrium price is p * U E = 1 3
(a − τ + c).
• Otherwise, there is a unique constrained equilibrium with optimal strategies
The Nash equilibrium price is
from my analysis in that they look at a model with two spot and two forward markets in each period and no production cost.
I graphically compare equilibrium prices under the counterfactual model with prices under the feed-in tari (gure 5) and with those under the xed premium (gure 6). Because I want to demonstrate the basic eects of my model, I assume the premium to be zero in this subsection. The amount of the premium is further discussed in subsection 5.2. (1) When compared to the feed-in tari, the unconstrained equilibrium of the counterfactual model induces a market power eect (shaded triangle in gure 5). As a result of the renewable electricity producer choosing his production strategically − instead of dumping all available electricity on the market −, the duopoly uses its market power and optimizes aggregate production to keep prices at a relatively high and stable level that is independent of the available amount of the renewable energy source, p
(a + c). On the contrary, feed-in tari prices decrease proportionally to the amount of available renewable electricity, p
(2) The xed premium scheme, compared to the unconstrained equilibrium of the counterfactual model, leads to a competitive eect (vertical arrow in gure 6) as a result of both producers using the forward market. As soon as the unconstrained equilibrium in the xed premium model is reached (i.e. when k ≥ k 1 ), both producers start forwarding which increases aggregate electricity production; equilibrium prices jump down, p
However, the competitive pressure from the forward market is reduced. Knowing that prices in the unconstrained equilibrium would decrease, the electricity producers extend the constrained equilibrium, in which the pro-competitive forward market is not used, to relatively higher levels of available renewable energy (reduced pressure). Still, compared to the unconstrained equilibrium (a + c), prices in the constrained equilibrium of the xed premium model are smaller and decrease proportionally to available renewable energy, p
The two outcomes, market power and competitive eect, materialize when a feed-in tari is replaced by a xed premium. Because they work in opposite directions, the nal impact on equilibrium prices depends on which eect dominates; this varies with the available amount of renewable electricity (see gure 7): • If a high level of renewable energy is available, the market power of the duopoly outweighs the competitive eect, which is induced by the forward market: The xed premium increases prices above feed-in tari levels. There is a negative eect of the xed premium on competition.
• If an intermediate level of renewable energy is available, the market power of the duopoly is oset by the competitive eect, which is induced by the forward market: The xed premium decreases prices below feed-in tari levels.
There is a positive eect of the xed premium on competition.
Note that the occurrence of this positive eect is largely reduced by the producers' manipulation of the renewable production constraint (k 1 > q * U CI r ). It may be further reduced, if we allow for multiple equilibria; though, it will not disappear.
28
• If renewable production is constrained, prices under the two schemes are the same.
Amount of the Fixed Premium
The results thus far show that the introduction of a xed premium for renewable electricity alters producer strategies, with two opposing outcomes: market power and competition. This subsection analyzes how the amount of the premium shapes these eects. Broadly speaking, increasing the level of the premium raises the remuneration of the renewable producer, which has two eects on the equilibria.
(1) A higher premium mitigates the market power of the electricity duopoly and reduces the price level in the unconstrained equilibrium, p * U CI = 1 5
(a − 2τ + 2c). With a higher remuneration, unconstrained renewable equilibrium production, q * U CI r = 2 5
(a + 3τ + 2c), increases and crowds out conventional equilibrium production, q * U CI c
(a − 2τ − 3c). The rise in renewable production per unit increase of the premium exceeds the loss in conventional production in absolute terms.
29 Aggregate electricity production increases putting pressure on the equilibrium price level in the unconstrained equilibrium. (See arrow (1) in gure 8.)
(2) However, also the conventional restriction threshold,
(a − 3c − 2τ ), grows with the premium. For a higher premium, the opportunity cost of market power is more important and the unconstrained equilibrium becomes relatively less protable to the conventional producer. 30 Its occurrence is reduced to relatively higher levels of k only. (See arrow (2) in gure 8.) 28 When accounting for the multiplicity of equilibria, the constrained equilibrium in in gure 7 extends to levels of k that exceed k 1 . However, it never exceeds the point where the equilibrium prices of the two support schemes intersect, because τ <τ implies that k 2 , which is the maximum amount of k at which the constrained equilibrium is possible, is smaller than k at the intersection. See gure 4. . 30 As stated in (1), in the unconstrained equilibrium, conventional equilibrium production and equilibrium prices decrease with an increase in the premium. In the constrained equilibrium, neither production, q * CI c
, are aected by a change in the premium.
There exists a 'prohibitive premium' under which prices under the xed premium never dier from those under the feed-in tari. Once the premium passes τ = 1 2
(a − 3c), the conventional restriction threshold lies outside the possible range of k. 31 There is a constrained equilibrium for the whole parameter range. Prices under both support schemes are the same. Figure 8 shows equilibrium prices under the xed premium scheme for τ = 0.
The arrows indicate how an increase in the level of the premium aects prices according to the two eects. A higher premium reduces the electricity producers' market power in the unconstrained equilibrium, by pushing cheap renewable electricity production. It also reduces the area in which prices under both support schemes vary. Setting the premium too high, even eliminates any strategic eect. In this case, the price under the xed premium scheme does never dier from that under the feed-in tari.
In the opposite case, the argument goes that a lower premium enlarges the area in which the strategic eects occur and intensies market power.
Winners and Losers
Until now, I have only looked at the relative eects on equilibrium prices. However, market competition is not the only issue that matters when changing the support scheme for renewable electricity. This subsection analyzes how the current ndings translate into welfare eects and determines winners and losers from the policy change, by focusing on the two dierent types of producers.
The conventional producer's equilibrium prots under the two support schemes are π
ifτ > τ and k > k 1 . This is to say, if the unconstrained equilibrium is valid, a switch from the feed-in tari to the xed premium always translates into a net gain for conventional electricity producers. If the constrained equilibrium is valid, prots are not aected by the change in support schemes.
The renewable producer's equilibrium prots are π U CI r = 2 25
(a + 3τ + 2c) 2 and π
(2a − 11c), renewable electricity producers are likely to be worse o in the unconstrained equilibrium of the xed premium scheme compared to the feed-in tari. Only if low premium levels, τ < 1 9
(2a − 11c), are combined with very high amounts of available renewable energy, 32 renewable electricity producers may gain in the unconstrained equilibrium of the xed premium.
33 Again, prots do not change if the constrained equilibrium is valid.
Also policy-makers risk to lose in the unconstrained equilibrium of the xed premium. As explained in section 4, ifτ > τ and k > k 1 , parts of renewable production are withhold, q * U CI r < q * F IT r
. This reduces the likelihood of reaching the political target to increase renewable electricity production.
To conclude, although support schemes are implemented to back electricity production from renewable sources of energy, a switch from the feed-in tari to the xed premium seems to favor production from conventional energy sources. Furthermore, the change in support schemes puts compliance with European targets at risk.
Discussion
From the results of subsections 5.1 to 5.3, I conclude that, when using wholesale equilibrium prices as an indicator for market eciency, the argumentation of the European Commission has to be rened. Implementing a feed-in premium − instead of a feed-in tari − as support scheme for renewable electricity does not necessarily increase market eciency. In my model, the relative eect on competition depends on three aspects: (1) on the design of the premium − there is no eect if a oating premium is implemented −, (2) on the amount of the xed premium, and (3) on the availability of the renewable energy source, which may vary according to the time of the day or year and across European member states 
33 For τ < 1 9 (2a − 11c), the premium is low enough to make the unconstrained equilibrium protable to the renewable electricity producer at relatively high levels of k. As soon as τ ≥ 1 9 (2a − 11c), the premium is so high, that the renewable producer prefers the constrained equilibrium for the whole parameter space. That is:
26 that dier with respect to installed renewable capacity.
Taking my model literally shows that the introduction of the xed premium may even reduce market eciency and risks to strengthen market power:
Market power issues are more likely to arise when a lot of renewable energy is available, because electricity producers have an incentive and room for maneuver to increase prices. The lower the level of the premium, the stronger and the more likely this market power will be.
Note that a high level of renewable energy may, in some countries, be associated with multiple renewable electricity producers. It is very likely that this alleviates the market power eect, which is emphasized in my duopoly model. The multiplicity of renewable electricity producers should be less of an issue in countries with high amounts of capital intensive oshore wind or concentrated solar power stations, such as Denmark and Spain.
Because there is a political will to further push renewable electricity production and to do this at lowest cost, we can expect an increase in available renewable energy and a decrease in premium levels in the medium term. My model predicts that market power is strengthened and more likely to occur in such a situation. Winners are conventional electricity producers.
Finally, note that my analysis looks at wholesale electricity markets in the short run. In the long run, renewable capacity will be endogenous on the support scheme in place. It is likely to decrease under the xed premium for two reasons. First, as no xed remuneration is guaranteed for the renewable electricity producer, the incentive to build production facilities is reduced. Second, similar to what argue Grimm and Zoettl (2006) and Liski and Montero (2014) , the use of the forward market may depress prices in the spot market when the unconstrained equilibrium is valid. This may further reduce investment incentives.
The relative long-term price eect, which is induced by a switch from the feedin tari to the xed premium, should again depend on the available amount of renewable energy. For instance, assume that a xed premium is newly implemented and that, subsequently, renewable capacity is reduced. In gure 7, this policy change would translate into a move from the solid feed-in price line at a given point,k, to the dashed premium price line for a new k <k. The price eect of this capacity reduction depends on the initial capacity level (i.e. the location oḟ k). The more abundant renewable capacity initially (i.e. the higherk), the more likely the market power eect also prevails in the long run.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
European support schemes for renewable electricity aect the functioning of the wholesale electricity market and are currently revised, with the aim of enhancing competition and market eciency. Two support schemes are at the center of the debate: feed-in taris and feed-in premiums. In my paper, I propose a model to analyze both support schemes in terms of their impact on producer strategies and competition in the wholesale electricity market.
I nd that replacing the feed-in tari by a oating premium scheme has no eect on producer strategies or competition. Using a xed premium scheme instead may alter producer strategies with two opposing eects on competition. On the one hand, electricity producers unilaterally have an incentive to sell on the forward market, which decreases wholesale prices. On the other hand, electricity producers in the aggregate choose production so as to keep prices at high levels.
The net eect on wholesale market competition depends on the amount of renewable energy that is available. The more abundant the renewable energy source, the more likely the market power eect of the oligopoly outweighs the competitive eect of the forward market. As a consequence, the xed premium would lower competition relative to the feed-in tari. Because of the political will to push renewable electricity production, this situation is likely to occur more often in the future. Also the level of the premium plays an important role. Reducing the premium may strengthen the market power of the electricity oligopoly.
These results should be taken into account in current discussions about the design of support schemes for renewable electricity. Rather than justifying a push towards the feed-in premium by solely focusing on the enhanced reactivity of renewable producers to market forces, we need to consider the aggregate behavior of electricity producers. So far, the economic literature has not dealt with this issue.
My paper shows that the xed premium has an ambiguous eect on wholesale market competition. The underlying motivation for its introduction − market eciency − does not necessarily hold. A change towards the premium scheme may not translate in higher market eciency but could increase market power. The welfare analysis underlines that potential winners of this policy change are conventional electricity producers. Renewable production is likely to decline, which risks compliance with the political targets.
The paper, therefore, recommends further analysis as to when the feed-in premium's positive impact of bringing renewable energies closer to the market outweighs its negative impact of inducing a new type of market ineciency. This recommendation is linked to the argumentation of Europe's leading energy economists.
In a current open letter to the responsible Commissioners, they warn against potential negative impacts that are linked to the introduction of a feed-in premium. (Fabra et al., 2014) Furthermore, European policy makers need to keep in mind that the availability of renewable energy varies across European member states, where dierent amounts of renewable capacity are installed. My paper reveals that the capacity level of renewable energy is crucial in determining competitive eects. As a consequence, the relative performance of the feed-in premium varies across European member states. A one-size-ts-all approach for Europe may, in that sense, not be appropriate.
As noted above, my results − as part of a static Cournot model − should be seen as a worst case scenario which helps direct policy makers to areas where problems are highly likely to occur. Extending the analysis to a supply function equilibrium model could rene the results but also risks to complicate their interpretation.
Finally, some may argue that the amount of renewable energy that is available for production depends on nature (e.g. availability of wind/sun) and might not always be predictable the day-ahead. 34 A potential extension would be to analyze the model in a probabilistic framework.
For example, one could introduce uncertainty about renewable production at the moment where forward contracts are signed and relieve it at the moment where production takes place. The literature generally models uncertainty in renewable electricity production as a shock to residual demand for conventional electricity. However, the underlying assumption is not appropriate when dierent support schemes are considered. Though this modeling strategy is still valid to represent electricity production under a feed-in tari or a oating premium, it needs to be adapted in the presence of a xed premium scheme. Because renewable producers become strategic market participants under the xed premium, they will reect the production uncertainty in their market behavior and interact with their competitors. It is not clear how production strategies are aected.
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As mentioned above, in such a framework it will be more dicult to disentangle the strategic eects from the producer's risk attitude. This task is further complicated as the involved risk is likely to dier with the support scheme in place: Full insurance is provided to the renewable producer under the feed-in tari, whereas insurance is only partial under the xed premium scheme.
